Phenomenology and pragmatist conceptions of cognitive science
Abstract
In this paper I argue that there is a parallelism between, on the one hand, the reactions of some phenomenologists to the philosophy of Husserl (in particular, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Ortega y Gasset) and, on the other, some recent pragmatist conceptions within the philosophy of logic and the philosophy of the cognitive sciences. Against syntactical, and ultimately Cartesian, understandings of cognition, both fields highlight the intrinsically pragmatic, embedded and embodied character of mind and language.Downloads
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