The original position and the rationality of Primo Levi’s shame
Abstract
Contrary to what he expected, Primo Levi didn’t experience his life after being released from Auschwitz as cheerful and light-hearted. He – like many other survivors – was haunted by an obscure and solid anguish that he finally identified as springing from a sense of shame or guilt in front of those who were exterminated in the Lager. Levi was unable to either acknowledge his shame as rational or reject it as irrational. This looks, though, like a rather unstable situation calling for some further elucidation. I will thus examine Levi’s shame in light of the dominant conception of practical deliberation and, more specifically, in view of the the role that John Rawls ascribes to the original position. Firstly, I will stress how Rawls’ use of the original position as a representational device to the determine the principles of justice relies a certain assumption (i.e., the Matching Assumption) that Levi’s experience calls into question and, secondly, I will identify two assumptions (i.e, The Control Assumption and The Third-Party Assumption) that are constitutive of Rawls’ conception of rationality and such that they may account for Levi’s reluctance to acknowledge the rationality of his shame. Once these constraints are brought out, I will argue that Levi’s experience provides serious reason to call them into question inasmuch as it invites the existence of a fundamental asymmetry between the first- and the third-person perspectives (sec. 3-5). I will thus conclude that Primo Levi could coherently have regarded his blame as rational, even though no third party is in a position to blame him. This challenge to the primacy of the third-person perspective will provide, in turn, an additional argument against Rawls’ original position and the dominant conception of practical deliberation.Downloads
The author retains the copyright of his work whilst granting anyone the possibility “to reproduce, distribute, publicly communicate, publicly exhibit, display, perform and recite the work”, provided that the author and the title of the journal are cited correctly. When submitting the text for publication the author is furthermore required to declare that the contents and the structure of the work are original and that it does not by any means compromise the rights of third parties nor the obligations connected to the safeguard of the moral and economic rights of other authors or other right holders, both for texts, images, photographs, tables, as well as for other parts which compose the contribution. The author furthermore declares that he/she is conscious of the sanctions prescribed by the penal code and by the Italian Criminal and Special Laws for false documents and the use false documents, and that therefore Bollettino Filosofico is not liable to responsibilities of any nature, civil, administrative or penal, and that the author agrees to indemnify and hold Bollettino Filosofico harmless from all requests and claims by third parties.