Rispondere all’altro: autonomia ed eteronomia tra Levinas e Waldenfels

Abstract

The article aims to discuss the issue of responsibility towards the other taking into account the criticisms that Bernhard Waldenfels addresses to the Levinasian philosophy. In Otherwise than Being Levinas argues that subjectivity is characterized by passivity, insofar as it is constitutively “exposed” to the other, in such a way that it cannot escape responsibility. Waldenfels criticizes this Levinasian conception, arguing that the “trauma” which according to Levinas affects the subject leaves no room for the possibility of choosing the response. In this regard, I show that even Levinas’s view admits the possibility of giving different responses, since the subject is never in a “dual” relationship, but there is always also the “third”, which requires comparison. As a consequence, heteronomy does not in any way cancel the principle of autonomy.

Keywords: Responsibility, Autonomy, Heteronomy, Levinas, Waldenfels