Social rights and the principle of budgetary balance in the Covid-19 emergency

  • Antonio Tipaldi
Keywords: social rights, European Union, pandemic

Abstract

The present work aims to verify the terms of the dialogue between Charters and Courts with regard to the rights of assets by examining the principle of financial equilibrium (or even budget) of recent constitutionalisation (2012). In the context of a systematic re-reading of the constitutional precepts, it is not possible to separate the economic rules from fundamental rights, including social rights, since the material order of constitutional values imposes the recognition of an absolute primacy for the human person and his dignity. Indeed, the constitutional court, in the difficult balance between the principle of budgetary equilibrium and constitutional protection of fundamental rights, clearly favors the latter because the needs of the budget can not prejudice the protection of social rights guaranteed by the Constitution ex art 117, second paragraph, letter m), both at a supranational level, by the European Social Charter, which recognizes and guarantees the second generation rights. The worldwide spread of the Covid-19 pandemic is certainly affecting the rules dictated by the EU on the economic-financial level, imposing, among other things, new and delicate scenarios regarding the renegotiation of the aforementioned common rules.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.
Published
2020-07-01
How to Cite
TipaldiA. (2020). Social rights and the principle of budgetary balance in the Covid-19 emergency. Diritto Pubblico Europeo. Rassegna On-Line, 14(2). https://doi.org/10.6092/2421-0528/7010
Section
Osservatorio permanente sul futuro dell'Unione europea