‘Federal’ homogeneity and identity conflicts in the European constitutional scenario. The case of the Conditionality Regulation

Abstract

The article is divided into two main parts. The first questions the concept of «homogeneity», often proposed as a way to identify a minimum common denominator among member states that ensures the stability of the European constitutional area. The second part applies this examination to specific recent constitutional conflicts, including the Court of Justice’s ruling in the cases of Hungary and Poland v. Parliament and Council. In these rulings, the Court emphasized that the common values set out in Article 2 of the Treaty «define the very identity of the European Union as a common legal order». While these statements have significant implications for past case law and the evolution of European law, they also raise potential ambiguities. Namely, they risk reinforcing interpretations of the Union’s identity that contradict the constitutional identities of member states. Therefore, reconstructing the relationship between homogeneity, conflict, and identity is crucial for understanding the Union as a «plural unity» and ensuring a genuinely «plural» and democratic interpretation of the integration process